ADMINISTERED PROTECTION - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND ANTIDUMPING REGULATION
Kevin S. Marshall J.D., M.P.A., Ph.D.
Inspired by and drawing from the work of many who have addressed similar and related issues of trade protectionism (e.g., Taussig, Schattschnieder, Bhagwati, Pastor, Rugman, Anderson, Brovard, Finger, Hall, Nelson, Boltuck, Litan, Pattison, Clubb, Waller, just to name a few), this study analyzes the historical development and application of the United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty legislation from a political economy perspective. Political Economy is concerned with depicting relationships between political processes and economic processes. It is grounded on an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the human condition within an institutional framework. It is from this perspective that the following study proceeds and concludes.
It is well settled that national wealth is the result of multi-dimensional causes including the external physical circumstances of the countries in question, the intelligence and moral character of their people, and their political and social institutions. The U.S. process of administered protection is among those institutions that impacts national wealth. To assess that impact, this study employs three political-economic perspectives: 1) economic theory, 2) public choice theory, and 3) institutional theory. A Coasean economic theory of regulation suggests the process is inefficient. Public interest theory suggests that the process is unprincipled and unfair. And institutional theory suggests the process is biased toward protectionism. From a domestic perspective, the extent to which this process is inefficient suggests that it negatively impacts national wealth. From a foreign policy perspective, the extent to which the process is a system of de facto protectionism threatens the legitimacy of the United States' proclaimed commitment to liberalized international trade. The extent to which the process is unprincipled and unfair (that is, characterized by unguided discretion and arbitrariness in procedure or outcome) it undermines the legitimacy of policy and the governmental process itself. And finally, the extent to which systematic bias is institutionalized within the formal rules and organizational behaviors of agencies responsible for administering this process it threatens the international trade policy of the GATT and WTO.
Dr. Kevin S. Marshall attended Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, where he majored in the study of economics. During the fall of 1980, he attended the London School of Economics where he engaged in the study of various topics in political economy. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, with a major in Economics from Knox College in May 1982. Upon graduating from Knox College, he attended Emory Universityâ€™s School of Law in Atlanta, Georgia, where he was conferred the degree of Juris Doctorate in May 1985. Dr. Marshall practiced law in Dallas, Texas for approximately twenty (20) years in the areas of state/federal civil procedure and commercial litigation, as well as domestic and international competition law. While engaged in the practice of law, Dr. Marshall received the degree of Master of Public Affairs from the University of Texas at Dallas in May of 1991. In December of 1993, he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Economy from the University of Texas, Dallas. Additionally, Dr. Marshall is certified in Quantitative Methods and Economic Analysis by the University of Texas at Dallasâ€™ School of Social Sciences for his academic achievement and coursework in Descriptive and Inferential Statistics, Costs-Benefits Analysis, Social Science Research Methods, Regression Analysis, Advanced Regression Analysis, and Econometrics. In the summer of 2004 Dr. Marshall accepted a tenured track position with the University of La Verne College of Law in Ontario, California where he presently serves as Assistant Professor of Law, teaching such courses as trade regulation, antitrust, remedies, contracts and law & economics. Dr. Marshall additionally serves as an adjunct faculty member for the University of La Verne College of Business and Public Management teaching graduate courses in economics and finance. Dr. Marshall has further served as both a testifying and consulting economic expert with respect to economic damages in personal injury, wrongful death, commercial, breach of contract, wrongful termination, employment discrimination, unfair competition and antitrust cases. Dr. Marshall has published and presented numerous articles involving the interdisciplinary workings of law and economics.